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NUMBER 1

The doctrine of governmental immunity from liability has been
the subject of extensive study. Professor Minge has undertaken to
analyze the Wyoming law of governmental immunity. After tracing
the doctrine's origin and explaining the rationale, he analyzes its
application to both state and local governments and treats the exceptions
to the general rule of immunity.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM
DAMAGE ACTIONS IN WYOMING
David Minge*
It is as much the duty of Government to render
prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as
it is to administer the same between private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of claims
in their nature belong to the judicial department.'
-Abraham Lincoln
I.

T

INTRODUCTION

diversified activities of modern government inevitably
result in injury to persons and damage to property. Who
should bear these losses ? Historically this question has been
answered in favor of the state. Without its consent, the state
has been immune from damage actions. It and, to a lesser extent, municipalities have been protected by the doctrine of
governmental immunity.2 Thus innocent persons are left to
HE

Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; B.A. 1964, St. Olaf
College; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago; Member of Minnesota Bar.
1. First Annual Message to Congress, 7 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS 3245, 3252 (1897), quoted in Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 827 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
2. The phrases "governmental immunity" and "sovereign immunity" are
synonymous. Since the latter connotes an independent state subject to no
limitations, it will not be used. Unless otherwise indicated, governmental
immunity will include the immunity of both state and local government.
*Assistant
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bear the losses caused by wrongs of organized society. The
incongruity of this situation in a nation dedicated to protecting the rights of the individual has elicited a torrent of cornment in the legal periodicals,' and in many states has even led
to the abandonment of the governmental immunity doctrine.'
The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which
governmental immunity shields the state of Wyoming and its
political subdivisions from liability for damages-primarily
damages in tort-and to make some recommendations.'
A. Background
Although the origin of the governmental immunity doctrine is uncertain, it has a long history in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. The English maxim, "the King can do no
wrong," was an early expression of the doctrine.' Perhaps
this immunity was developed in the drive to clothe the king
with the powers of a divine-right ruler.' Yet when the prerogatives of the king were eventually limited, the immunity
of the crown for its torts and the torts of a crown servant
remained as a part of the common law.' It is one of the
anomalies of legal history that in England the growth of parliamentary democracy was accompanied by the retention of a
rule that placed the losses caused by the wrongful acts of the
crown upon the innocent victim. This phenomenon becomes
even more mysterious when compared with the trend on the
3. For the classic and most comprehensive survey and a trenchant criticism
of the doctrine see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34
YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925), Governmental Responsibility in Tort
(pts. 4-6), 36 YALE LJ. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927), Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pt. 7), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 577 (1928), Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pt. 8), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1928). For
excellent symposia and references to the voluminous literature see 9 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 179 (1942); 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1321 (1954); 1966
U. ILL. L.F. 795. For discussion of various aspects of the doctrine in
Wyoming see 16 WYo. L.J. 304 (1962); Comment, Municipal Tort Liability: Purchase of Liability Insurance as a Waiver of Immunity, 18 Wyo.
L.J. 220 (1964).
4. DA'IS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 25.00 (Supp. 1970); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919. For
the most recent abandonment see Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs,
_

Colo. _

482 P.2d 968

(1971).

5. The extent to which the state, its political subdivisions, and public officials
and employees may be subject to injunction actions and the extraordinary
writs is beyond the scope of this article. In addition, actions to recover
moneys paid as taxes or fines are not included.
6.

See 1 BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES *246.

7. See Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, supra note 4, 482 P.2d at 969.
8.

See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTION 203-04

(1965);

Borchard, supra note 3, 36 YALE L.J. at 35-38.
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continent to make even autocratic governments more and
more responsible in tort.'
Since the United States was formed in part to avoid the
injustices of the English crown, one would think that the immunity doctrine would never have taken root in this country.
Such was not the case. Without exception state courts followed the doctrine.1" When legislatures attempted to ameliorate the harshness of the rule, the courts neutralized their efforts." It was not until the late 1950's that state courts began to reassess the problem and abolish what in essence was a
judicially created principle."2
On the other hand, the immunity of the states when sued
in federal courts was not always assured. Article III, Section
2 of the United States Constitution allowed federal courts to
hear certain actions brought against states by private parties:
The judicial Power [of the Federal Courts] shall
extend... to Controversies . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State . . . and between a State
. ..and foreign... Citizens or Subjects.
In Chisholm v. Georgia,3 the Supreme Court held that a state
could be sued for damages in a federal court by the citizen of
another state. The Chisholm decision was upsetting to the
states who were concerned that the federal courts might limit
their sovereign prerogatives, particularly their prerogatives
in connection with the repayment of the large debts they had
contracted to finance the Revolutionary War." This concern
led to the quick adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which
overruled Chisholm." Although sometimes unhappy with the
9. See Barry, Governmental Tort Liability in the Soviet Union, 20 RUTGERS
L. REV. 300, 301-02 (1066); Borchard, supra note 3, 28 COLUM. L. REV. at
591-617, 734-72; Pock, Systems of Public Responsibility in Switzerland,
Germany, and Austria, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 1023.
10. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States
1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795, 801-05.
11. Id. at 805; Borchard, supra note 3, 34 YALE L.J. at 9-11.
12. Supra note 4.
13. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793).
14. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821). At the time
the Constitution was being ratified Alexander Hamilton, James Madison
and John Marshall had, in fact, assured the states that their immunity
was inherent in their sovereignty and would not be limited by the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton);
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 533, 555-56 (2d ed. 1836).

15. The Eleventh Amendment provides that
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, comemnced or prosecuted
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doctrine of governmental immunity, the Supreme Court has
upheld it'" except in connection with certain actions predicated on federally created rights. 7
Local units of government have also been granted immunity from damage actions.' As political subdivisions of
the state, their organization, structure, and operations are
all governed by detailed legislative guidelines and many of
their activities are undertaken on behalf of the state. For this
reason the various local governmental entities are said to
share in the state's immunity from suit. It is misleading,
however, to identify them so closely with the state. These political subdivisions are individual corporate entities distinct
from the state with special or local constituencies, popularly
elected governing bodies, certain taxing powers, and separate
treasuries. Only the state has any claim to sovereignty-the
attribute which traditionally was thought to require immunity. 9 Thus at least one court was willing to strip all local
units of government of their immunity while retaining the
state's immunity."
In addition to distinguishing between the immunity of
state and local governments, it is important to distinguish between municipalities and other units of local government
which collectively have been called quasi-corporations.2 1 Quasicorporations would include counties and the special districts
created by the legislature, the most significant of which are
school districts. The courts have tended to identify quasicorporations with the state and grant them the same degree of
inmunity as the state. Municipalities are more independent.
They traditionally have been formed by the residents and they
possess rather extensive powers. As compared to counties
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
16. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Langford v. United States,
101 U.S. 341 (1879).
17. Comment, Waiver of State Immunity: Private Damage Actions Against the
Cf.
States Arising Under Federal Law, 50 B.U.L. REv. 590 (1970).
Borchard, supra note 3, 34 YALE L.J. at 16-22; text accompanying notes
104-05 infra.

The discussion in this paragraph and the next are based in part upon
Borchard, supra note 3, 34 YALE L.J. at 41-45, 129-43; Kramer, supra
note 10, at 810-21.
19. See p. 234 infra.
20. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
21. They were called quasi-corporations because they were initially unincorporated.
18.
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and special districts they are subject to much less actual control by the state. For these reasons courts early distinguished
municipalities from the state and quasi-corporations and occasionally even said they were subject to the same liabilities
as private corporations.22 This uncertainty over whether and
how much immunity should be accorded municipalities was resolved by the emergence of the governmental-proprietary distinction, liability being imposed only for what could be classified as a proprietary activity. In addition to liability on this
ground, it also became accepted that municipalities were
responsible for improper maintenance of public ways and
nuisances.2 8 Thus a common law of municipal responsibility
developed which allowed for liability in areas where the state
and quasi-corporations enjoyed immunity.
The logic of this disparate accordance of immunity to
different units of local government is questionable. All are
subject to legislative control; most are organized by local
initiative; most have elected governing bodies; all perform
services which are of particular benefit to residents. In view
of the basic unfairness of the immunity doctrine, it seems unjust to grant immunity to all other units of local government
in connection with activities for which municipalities would
be liable. With the gradual restriction of immunity, a unity
of approach is becoming the law in some states."
B. Rationale
Although Professor Borchard has shown that the governmental immunity doctrine which developed in this country
was without historical parallel, 5 the belief that governmental
immunity has the sanction of history is probably the greatest
single reason why it has continued. Apparently once the first
states had adopted the doctrine, others followed with little
or no analysis.2 6 Thereafter judicial inertia and hostility to
22. See Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal
Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REv. 250 (1937).
23. These exceptions to municipal immunity as they have been developed in
Wyoming are discussed at pp. 249-61 infra.
24. E.g., note 20 supra.
25. Borchard, supra note 3. His entire series of articles seems to be directed
at proving the absence of any historical or logical basis for governmental
immunity.
26. Kramer, supra note 10, at 801-04.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 7 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VII

the few halting legislative attempts to reform the doctrine reinforced the initial mistake. 7 Only in recent years have
courts recognized the scantiness of the historical justification
for governmental immunity.2 8
Varying attempts have been made to justify governmental immunity on a basis other than stare decisis. Mr.
Justice Holmes contended:
A sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends.2 9
The validity of Holmes statement has been refuted.3" It rests
upon a view of the state propounded in the late Middle Ages
to bolster claims of divine right monarchs. In this country
ultimate power and sovereignty rest with the electorate; the
authority of the state is subject to their will. It is by no means
clear that the people intended to clothe the state with such
immunity. It should also be noted that, even assuming the
validity of Holmes' statement, the immunity required thereby does not logically extend to local government because local
government does not make the fundamental law which guides
its actions.
It has been asserted that in addition to history and logic,
practical considerations necessitate the doctrine of governmental immunity. Allegedly, without immunity the government may be subjected to disruptive and demeaning litigation
and to potential liabilities which would bankrupt the public
treasuries. 1 However, the experiences of those jurisdictions
27. Id. at 805. Borchard, supra note 3, 34 YALE L.J. at 9-11; Leflar &
Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363, 1365
(1954).
28.

E.g., Evans v. Board of
969 (1971).

County Comm'rs, __

Colo. __, 482 P.2d 968,

29. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
30. Borchard, supra note 3, 36 YALE L.J. at 757-807.
31.

See Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity,
36 S. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1963); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154

For Wyoming cases which suggest these reasons see Ellis v.
(1868).
Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 74 Wyo. 226, 231, 286 P.2d 597, 598
(1955) and Wilson v. City of Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234, 250, 199 P.2d 119, 124
(1948) (Both opinions quote cases which held the government immune to
prevent disruptive and vexatious litigation.); and Smith v. Town of Lander,
67 Wyo. 121, 215 P.2d 861 (1950) (Expense of keeping streets and crosswalks free of ice would be too great a financial burden.). The states concern with their debts were thought to be the reason for the passage of
the Eleventh Amendment. Supra note 14.
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which waived their immunity should allay both fears.2 The
governmental machinery has not been stymied by suits. Although the liability is an additional expense, the taxing power
of government and the availability of liability insurance
make public bankruptcy unlikely and unnecessary. Governmental entities, like private corporations, can both function
efficiently and bear the loss their operations inflict upon
others.

II.

BASES OF IMMUNITY IN WYOMING

A. State
In Wyoming the state has enjoyed a broad degree of
governmental immunity; however, the basis of this immunity
is uncertain. The first reported Wyoming decision to discuss the question of the state's immunity was Hjorth Royalty
Co. v. Trustees of the University of Wyoming," an action to
quiet title to certain lands in which the University allegedly
had a possible interest. Rather than litigate the validity of
that interest, the University asserted that it was immune from
suit. The court found that the suit actually challenged the
state's, not the University's interest in the subject land"4 and
held that under a provision of Article I, Section 8 of the
Wyoming Constitution the state was immune from suit. That
provision reads as follows: "Suits may be brought against
the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature
may by law direct."3 5 The court said:
The general rule appears to be that such provisions are not self-executing, and no suit can be maintained against the state until the Legislature has
made provision therefor, and no consent having been
given by the state it is evident that this suit could
not be maintained against the state .... ."
32. See David & French, Public Tort Liability Administration: Organization,
Methods, and Expense, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 348 (1942); MacDonald,
The Administration of a Tort Liability Law in New York, 9 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 262 (1942); Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small
Municipalities, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 363 (1942).
33. 30 Wyo.309, 222 P. 9 (1924).
34. See State ex. rel. Wyoming Agriculture College v. Irvine, 14 Wyo. 318,
84 P. 90 (1906), aff'd 206 U.S. 278 (1907).
35. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of the Univ. of Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 309,
313, 222 P. 9 at 9 (1922) (citation omitted).
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Although subsequent Wyoming cases followed this analysis of Article I, Section 8," several allow that the state might
be liable without legislative action if the wrongful acts which
give rise to a claim occur in the course of priprietary, as
opposed to governmental activities.38 To say that the Constitution prohibits all suits against the state except those to
which the legislature has consented and then to admit that if
the state is engaged in a proprietary activity it can incur liability is inconsistent since the legislature has not codified the
governmental-proprietary distinction."5 Either the constitutional provision grants immunity or it does not. On its face
the provision would not seem to require immunity."
Although eighteen other states have constitutional provisions similar to Article I, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution,"' most cases from those jurisdictions are of no help
in resolving this matter.42 Even though a few courts have allowed the state to be held liable for proprietary activities,
they have made no effort to reconcile this with what was supposed to be a constitutional requirement that immunity be
87. Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964); Ellis v. Wyoming
Game & Fish Comm'n, 74 Wyo. 226, 286 P.2d 597 (1955); Price v. State
Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946); Utah Constr. Co. v.
State Highway Comm'n, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933); see Harrison
v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947); cf.
Osborn v. Lawson, 374 P.2d 201 (Wyo. 1962).
38. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, supra note 37; see Chavez v. City
of Laramie, Osborne v. Lawson, Ellis v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n,
all supra note 37. Cf. National Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo. 134, 241
P. 1063 (1925) where the court held that by depositing its funds in an
interest bearing account at a bank the state waived any preference in the
bank's assets upon liquidation on the ground that "when a state puts
itself on a level with private individuals, by engaging in a business enterprise, it, to that extent, loses its character as a sovereign." Id. at 152,
241 P. at 1067. The proprietary-governmental distinction is discussed at
pp. 249-55 infra.
39. It might be argued that the court is only saying that certain types of
special agencies created by the legislature are engaged in private enterprise
and thus are not "state agencies" for purposes of immunity. The Wyoming
court has not, however, indicated that this is its approach. Also such an
approach tends to draw unrealistic distinctions between what are obviously
state agencies for most, if not all, purposes. Finally it ignores the reasoning of the court in National Surety Co. v. Morris, supra note 38.
40. In fact, rather than creating immunity, the constitution perhaps merely
authorizes the legislature to regulate the procedure for and venue in
actions against the state. The legislature has in fact enacted such a
statute (WYO. STAT. § 1-1018 (1957)) and thus could be said to have
given legislative recognition to this more restrictive construction of Article
I, Section 8.
41. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FuND, COLUM. UNIV., INDEX DIGEST OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 988-89 (2d ed. 1959, Supp. 1965).
42. E.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E. 2d 82
(1947) cert. den. 332 U.S. 817 (1947); Fairclough v. Salt Lake County,
10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960).
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waived by legislative act.43 Two recent decisions have, however, recognized this inconsistency and have held that in fact
these constitutional provisions do not establish the states' immunity." The California court said:
It is contended, however, that [this provision]
should be interpreted as also having substantive significance and establishing the rule of immunity.
Such an interpretation would be contrary to [the
cases] which extended the state's liability to its proprietary activities. If the section has any substantive significance, it would appear to be a waiver of
immunity. On its face it seems to say that the state
may be held liable when suits are brought against it
in accordance with a legislatively described procedure."5
The California Constitution provides that "[s]uits may be
brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as
shall be directed by law."4 Since by contrast the Wyoming
Constitution substitutes "may" for "shall," 47 there is even
less reason for predicating state liability upon legislative
action in Wyoming. In Indiana, where the Constitution also
uses the word "may" instead of" shall,"48 the Supreme Court
decided that no such legislation was needed and that the liability of that state had nothing more than a common law
basis.4"
In sum, it is unclear whether the governmental immunity
of the State of Wyoming is based upon the Constitution or
common law. The State Supreme Court has the prerogative
of answering the question. The cases indicating state liability for proprietary functions" would seem to indicate a
43. See People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947) ; Gross v.
Kentucky Bd. of Managers, 105 Ky. 840, 49 S.W. 458 (1899).
44. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961); Perkins v. State, 18 Ind. 555, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969).
45. Muskopf v. Corning Rosp. Dist., supra note 44, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92-98,
359 P.2d at 460-61 (1961) (citations omitted). The Muskopf decision went
on to say that some indication of legislative consent to suit, such as a
provision enabling a governmental entity with the power to sue and to
be sued, was necessary. Whether the California court would have followed
such a requirement in subsequent cases is not clear. See VAN ALSTYNE,
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABIuTY § 3.4 (Calif. Practice Book No. 24,
1964).
46. CALIF. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (emphasis added).
47. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8.
48. IND. CONST. art. 4, § 24.
49. Perkins v. State, supra note 44.
50. Supra note 38.
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common law foundation. Yet despite the talk about proprietary functions, there are no reported cases in which recovery
has been allowed against the State of Wyoming in an action
in which the immunity defense has been pleaded. Whatever
the basis, the doctrine has been effective.
Even though the state's immunity thus seems to be secure,
several constitutional problems with such immunity ought
to be noted. The first sentence in Article I, Section 8 of the
Wyoming Constitution reads as follows: "All courts shall be
open and every person for an injury done . . . shall have justice administered without ... denial . . . . " Article I, Section
33 provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public or private use without just compensation. "
Article I, Section 6 as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution prohibits the state from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law. The Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees persons
the equal protection of the laws. Tort immunity denies justice,
damages private property without compensation or due process of law, and denies persons injured by public wrongs protection equal to that afforded those injured by private wrongs.
Except for holding that negligent damage is not a taking for
public use within Article I. Section 33,51 the Wyoming court
has not been presented with or spoken to any of these constitutional arguments. An intermediate Ohio court has recently
granted recovery against the state on the basis of the equal
protection clause,5 2 but neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the right to justice arguments have been used as a basis of
recovery in other jurisdictions."
51. Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964). However, it would
seem that the risk of fortuitously injuring innocent persons is a risk
inherent in the day to day operations of government and should be viewed
as a cost of doing business. If no compensation has to be paid, the state
is able to operate more cheaply and more recklessly; hence the damages
are "for public . . . use." A few cases have imposed liability for negligence
under identical constitutional provisions. See Kramer, supra note 10, at
806-07; Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26
MINN. L. REV. 854, 868-72 (1942); Price, Governmental Liability for Tort
in West Virginia, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 101, 114-16 (1932). Of course if the
state intentionally takes property, uses it for public purposes and refuses
to make payment there is a constitutional right to damages notwithstanding
governmental immunity.
52. Krause v. Ohio, 40 U.S. L.W. 2196 (Ohio App. Ct. Sept. 30, 1971). This
case evidently arose out of the killing of 4 students by the National Guard
at Kent State University in the spring of 1970.
58. See Comment, Governmental Immunity in Kansas, 19 KAN. L. REv. 211,
220-26 (1971).
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A word should be said about what is included in the term
"state." Although the State of Wyoming is obviously the
"state," it acts through agencies, departments, boards, and
commissions. Should they share in its immunity? By statute
any suit
against Wyoming farm loan board, board of land
commissioners, state board of charities and reform,
public service commission of Wyoming, state board
of equalization of Wyoming, or the trustees of the
University of Wyoming is hereby declared to be an
action against the State of Wyoming...."
This statute was followed in the only reported case in which
one of the named agencies was made a defendant.5 Although
the statute leaves unanswered the liability of other state agencies, prior to its enactment the Wyoming court quoted with
approval the following language:
"A suit against a department of the State Government or a board or corporation created by the
state for governmental purposes is a suit against
the state ....

In Harrisonv. Wyoming Liquor Commission" the argument
that the statute was exclusionary and that it thus narrowed
the earlier definition of "state" was rejected and that Commission was held to be entitled to the immunity of the state.
Other decisions have held that the Wyoming Game and Fish
Commission and the State Highway Commission are similarly
a part of the state and entitled to its immunity."8 Any board,
agency, commission, department or other body which is
created by law and operates through or pays its profits into
the state treasury would, according to the opinion in the
54. WYo. STAT. § 1-1018 (1957).
55. Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971). Although the University
has been a defendant in other cases and it has been accorded the state's
immunity, those cases were decided before Section 1-1018 was enacted.
See Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of the Univ. of Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 309,
222 P. 9 (1924); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Trustees of Univ. of Wyoming,
16 F.2d 150 (D. Wyo. 1926).
56. Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of Univ. of Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 309, 317-18,
222 P. 9, 11 (1924) quoting 36 CYCLOPEDIA or LAW & PROCEDURE, 919 (1910).
57. 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
58. Ellis v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 74 Wyo. 226, 286 P.2d 597 (1955);
Price v. State Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946). See
State Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194 (1929); Chavq
V. City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964),

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 7 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 9

240

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VII

Harrison case, share in the state's immunity so long as its
functions are governmental. 9 The fact that the body might
obtain revenue from its activities would not necessarily affect
this status." The degree to which units of local government
and individuals are considered part of the state for immunity
purposes is discussed below. 1
B. Local Government
In Wyoming local government includes municipalities,
counties and special purpose districts. By statute cities and
towns are municipalities. 2 The remaining units have been
called quasi-municipal or, in spite of the fact that they are
created as bodies corporate, quasi-corporations.
Although the doctrine of governmental immunity certainly applies to local entities of government in Wyoming,
its source is almost as uncertain as it is in the case of the
state. The question is whether the state's immunity or the
common law of municipal immunity is the basis. The problem is important since the exceptions to the immunity doctrine
are much more extensive for municipalities than the state. No
reported Wyoming cases have suggested that Article I, Section 8 of the state's Constitution establishes a constitutional
basis for local government immunity." There are, however,
several opinions indicating that when units of local government perform governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions for the state, or when they operate to promote the general health and welfare, they share in the state's immunity. 4
59. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
The governmental-proprietary distinction is discussed at pp. 249-55 infra.
60. Id.
61. See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
62. WYo. STAT. § 15.1-1 (1957).
63. But cf. Denver Buick, Inc. v. Pearson, 465 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1970) citing
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8 in a suit against a county clerk.
64. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710 (1925) ; see Bondurant
v. Board of Trustees, 354 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1960); Denver Buick, Inc. v.
Pearson, 465 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1970); Villalpando v. City of Cheyenne, 51
Wyo. 300, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937). But ef. Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402
P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1965) holding that if the legislature imposes a duty upon
a municipality, it is liable for the failure to comply with that duty.
Although these cases deal with municipalities and counties, the rationale
applies equally to special districts. School districts, for example, were
created by the legislature pursuant to constitutional mandate. See Wyo.
CONST. art. 21, § 28.
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There is a well developed body of common law on municipal immunity, and Wyoming cases65 have cited Russell v.
Men of Devon66 as authority for such immunity. In fact in
Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer," the Wyoming
Supreme Court determined that since by statute Wyoming
has adopted the common law as of 1609 as the rule of decision" s
and that since a sixteenth century English case digested in
Medieval French in Brooke's La Graunde Abridgment and
cited in Russell apparently spoke in favor of immunity,
municipal immunity is such a part of Wyoming law that it can
only be changed by the legislature. The necessity, to say
nothing of the wisdom, of this calcification of the common
law on the basis of a nameless decision, the report and digest
of which are not contained in any library in the state of Wyoming, is doubtful. It is not clear that either Russell or the pre1609 case involved questions of governmental, much less municipal, liability. In both cases only individuals, not any governmental entity, was being sued. In fact the only governmental entity referred to in Russell was an unincorporated
county without any treasury. If any governmental unit had a
relationship to the pre-1609 case, it too was undoubtedly no
more than an unincorporated rural area without a treasury.69
Furthermore it is ironic that both Russell and the pre-1609
case dealt with road maintenance for which municipalities
are now responsible." In any event such legal reasoning has
established governmental immunity as the basic rule for municipalities in Wyoming-subject, however, to exceptions and
qualifications to be discussed below.
Arguably other local units of government in Wyoming
also share in this municipal common law of immunity and the
concomitant responsibilities. Two Wyoming cases indicate
that special districts providing municipal type services have
only the limited immunity of a municipality."1 Perhaps coun65. Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808
(1959); Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710 (1925).
66. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
67. 80 Wyo. 83, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
68. WYO. STAT. § 8-17 (1957).
69. The foregoing analysis is based upon David, Municipal Liability in Tort
in California, 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 48, at 48-63 (1933).
70. See pp. 256-60 infra.
71. See South Cheyenne Water & Sewer Dist. v. Stundon, 483 P.2d 240 (Wyo.
1971); Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 391, 213 P. 938 (1923).
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ties and special districts are entitled to either the immunity
of the state or municipalities depending upon the nature of
the activities giving rise to the claim for relief. In any event,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has not yet discussed the matter.

III. THE

TRADITIONAL PROBLEM AREAS AND ExCEPTIONS TO

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN WYOMING

A. Employees
It is well established at common law that both the principal and his agent are liable in damages for the agent's torts
occurring in the course of the principal's business-the principal on the basis of respondeat superior, the agent because
he was the person actually committing the wrong.72 These
basic agency rules are, however, of limited applicability when
the principal is a governmental entity.
1. Respondeat Superior
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not constitute
an exception to the immunity doctrine; its rejection is inherent in the doctrine."3 This does not mean, however, that
governmental entities are never liable for agent's acts. If
an exception to the immunity doctrine has been made upon
one of the bases discussed below or the doctrine has been
abrogated, then respondeat superior would, of course, apply
to the extent of the exception or abrogation."4 Since it is a
truism that the government, like any artificial entity, can only
act through its agents, this inapplicability of respondeat superior is fundamental to the existence of immunity.
Most Wyoming cases have simply ignored the respondeat
superior question and have dismissed the injured party's
claim on the basis of governmental immunity.75 In some cases,
however, the matter has received passing comment. For
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 343 (1957). The literature on
this subject is voluminous. The more noteworthy articles are collected in
3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 26.01 n. 6 (1958).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 (1957). For a discussion of
the relationship between the two doctrines see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963).
74. See Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 391, 213 P. 938 (1923) (held
that act was proprietary and that Association could be estopped by acts
of its agent).
75. E.g. Price v. State Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946);
White v. City of Casper, 35 Wyo. 371, 249 P. 562 (1926).
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example in Houtz v. Board of Commissioners the court, in
refusing to refund a fine imposed by a justice of the peace
who was exceeding his jurisdiction, observed:
It is clear that the county would not be liable to
respond in damages as for a tort for the unwarranted
or illegal act of the justice [of the peace]."
2. Employee Liability
In Wyoming what cases there are indicate that suits
against employees are not likely to be successful. In Price
v. State Highway Commission7 7 the driver of a car involved in
an accident with a snowplow sued the State Highway Commission and two individuals, the State Highway Superintendent and the driver of the snowplow, for negligent operation of the vehicle. The negligence allegedly consisted of driving too slowly and failing to have visible warning lights. With
regard to the individual defendants the court determined that
since they were acting within the scope of their official authority, they partook of the state's governmental immunity.
It said that making officials and employees of the highway
department liable for accidents resulting from poor visibility
caused by snow removal operations would be comparable to
holding "firemen ...liable for water damage caused by them

in extinguishing a fire. ' 7'

Apparently the court felt that

when the risk of injury to the public is inherent in the activity,
employees ought not to bear that risk.
76. 11 Wyo. 152, 170, 70 P. 840, 842 (1902). See also Osborn v. Lawson, 374
P.2d 201 (Wyo. 1962) ; Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo.
33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959); ef. Kingen v. Kelley, 3 Wyo. 566, 28 P. 36 (1891)
(Court refused to attribute the illegal seizure of a suspected rustler in
Nebraska by a Laramie County deputy-sheriff to the county. The plaintiff
was collaterally attacking his conviction on the ground that the seizure
constituted the arrest which was thus illegal and left the criminal court
without jurisdiction.). An interesting pair of federal cases arising out of
Wyoming appear to disagree over the liability of municipalities to the
holders of assessment bonds for damages resulting from the alleged
wrongful reduction by municipal officers of assessments already levied.
Compare Gray v. Town of Thermopolis, 33 F. Supp. 73 (D. Wyo. 1936)
with Blanchar v. City of Casper, 91 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1936). In Gray
liability was imposed on the ground that the municipality had a duty to
the bondholders, that the municipality could only act through its agents,
and that its agent breached this duty. However, in Blanchar recovery was
not allowed on the ground that the bonds were not general obligations of
the city and could not be made such by the defalcations of municipal officers and on the ground that mandamus to reassess was the plaintiff's
exclusive remedy.
77. 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946).
78. Id. at 398, 167 P.2d at 313. But cf. Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 315 (1957) holding the government for negligence in fire fighting
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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In Osborn v. Lawson,"' the plaintiff's decedent had been
killed when he collided with a snowplow traveling west in the
east bound lanes of a divided highway. The plaintiff contended that this method of snow removal was negligent and
sought to hold liable the employee who was both driving the
snowplow and in charge of maintaining that section of the
highway. The defendant introduced evidence that the manner
of operation was pursuant to instructions of the Highway
Commission and was necessitated by the construction of the
snowplow with which he was furnished. Although the court
held the defendant driver immune from liability, how far this
immunity extended was not clear. At one point in its opinion
the Osborn court stated that "the Price case determined that
the driver of the snowplow was immune to the same extent
as the highway connission, '"

and went on to indicate that

employee immunity is co-extensive with the immunity of the
governmental entity for governmental functions. However,
the opinion then began to backtrack. It seemed to recognize
that government officials who are guilty of misfeasance as
opposed to nonfeasance are responsible for their negligent
acts. And in the end the court indicated that the defendant
driver's misfeasance was really not his and held him immune
from liability on the following rationale:
[T]he negligence, if any, in the operation of the
snowplow herein was the negligence of the highway
commission by reason of the fact that it prescribed
the method of operating the snowplow. The operator
...followed in his operation the directions prescribed
by his superior. He was compelled to do so or quit.
He had no other choice. If the highway commission
had itself performed the work which he did, it would
have been immune from liability. It would be highly
anomalous to hold the operator of the snowplow not
immune when he followed instructions in doing the
substantially identical thing in the substantially identical manner for which the highway commission would
be held immune and would moreover probably hinder
the highway commission in hiring men for a rather
hazardous work."'
79. 374 P.2d 201 (Wyo. 1962).
80. Id. at 203.
81. Id. at 205.
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Thus the Osborn case viewed the employee who followed instructions from his superior as being entitled to the immunity
of the state even if the instructions were negligent. 2 This
does not mean, however, that if the employee made a negligent
mistake which had no relationship to instructions from his
superior that the employee would enjoy immunity. In fact
neither the Price nor the Osborn case conceded employee
negligence.
Such employee negligence was assumed by the court in
3 and Spaniol Ford,
the cases of Denver Buick, Inc. v. Pearson"
s
4
Inc. v. Froggatt. In these cases county clerks were sued for
damages resulting from their alleged negligence in issuing
duplicate certificates of title on stolen cars which the plaintiffs subsequently purchased. In both cases the court concluded that the clerk was entitled to the immunity of the state
because the issuance of the certificate was a governmental,
as opposed to a ministerial duty."5 However, in both cases the
court indicated that the county clerks might be liable for
damages caused by their negligent ministerial acts.
Thus an area of liability of government employees was
conceded. It depends upon whether the negligent act is governmental or ministerial in nature. However, neither the
Denver Buick nor the Spaniol Ford opinions offered any
rationale for this distinction. The only suggestions as to which
duties are governmental and which are ministerial were two
apparently contradictory statements. In the Denver Buick
case the court said:
When duties are imposed upon a public officer,
such as a county clerk, by law rather than by some appointing power, such duties are usually governmental
and not ministerial86
In Spaniol Ford a definition of ministerial was ventured:
[A] duty is ministerial when the law prescribes the
mode and occasion of its performance with such cer82. Compare Borchard, supra note 3, 34 YALE L.J. at 8 where it is noted that
at common law the public employee is liable for following illegal orders.
83. 465 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1970).
84. 478 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1970).
85. This distinction was also drawn in Osborn v. Lawson, 374 P.2d 201 (1962).
86. 465 P.2d at 513.
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tainty that nothing is left to judgment or discretiona duty not involving official discretion. 7
This writer would suggest that both definitions are somewhat
accurate. The problem is not with the definitions but with
the attempt to draw a distinction between governmental and
ministerial duties. Although the terms governmental and
ministerial are a well-known part of the jargon of governmental immunity, it appears that in its haste to excuse the
county clerks in the Denver Buick and Spaniol Ford cases
the court confused two different methods of categorizing functions-governmental versus proprietary and discretionary
versus ministerial."8 To mix the methods and say for example
that a governmental function cannot be ministerial is absurd.
The filing and indexing of instruments by the county clerk is
regulated in detail by statute 9 and is a governmental function." In Spaniol Ford the court gave this as an example of
a ministerial duty." It is both governmental and ministerial.
However, in determining the liability of public officials and
employees the discretionary-ministerial distinction, not the
governmental-proprietary one, is customarily used by the
courts. 2 If an act is discretionary it gives rise to immunity;
otherwise there is liability."
The suggestion of the Spaniol Ford court that ministerial
acts are only those where the mode and occasion of perform87. 478 P.2d at 599.
88. Since immunity customarily attaches to governmental and discretionary
functions and liability to proprietary and ministerial functions, one is
tempted to ask what the result might be for a function which is a governmental-ministerial or discretionary-proprietary hybrid. For an example of
such an analysis of the Minnesota case law see Peterson, Governmental
Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 MINN. L. REV. 293, 296-99
(1942). Courts apparently have been confused in attempts to combine the
concepts. Kramer, supra note 10, at 820-21. It appears that traditionally
the governmental-proprietary distinction has been applied to questions of
municipal liability and the discretionary ministerial distinction to questions
of officer or employee liability. See 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §§
25.07, 26.01, 26.02 (1958). Generally speaking, the difficulty and arbitrariness of the governmental-proprietary distinction has led to its criticism
by the commentators and its abandonment by several jurisdictions. However,
most agree that properly applied the discretionary-ministerial distinction
is useful and necessary. For the treatment of the governmental-proprietary
distinction in Wyoming see pp. 249-55 infra.
89. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. §§ 18-123 to -140 (1957).
90. Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 391, 397, 213 P. 938, 940 (1923)
(dicta).
91. 478 P.2d at 599-600.
92. See note 88 supra.
93. That this may result in employee liability in situations where the governmental entity might enjoy immunity and vice versa, while anomalous, does
not seem to have bothered the courts.
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ance are so prescribed that nothing is left to judgment would
make almost everything discretionary." The simple making
of a decision cannot be equated with discretion. Rather, it is
suggested that an employee is engaged in a discretionary function only if he is required to consciously balance risks and advantages or make policy type decisions2 Thus a judge in
deciding matters is clearly involved in the exercise of discretion."6 Whether the issuance of duplicate certificates of
title on automobiles is discretionary of ministerial-the problem of the Denver Buick and Spaniol Ford cases- is more
difficult. The statute provides that the loss of the original
certificate is to be accounted for "to the satisfaction of the..
county officer . . . "" Although the statute obviously calls
for the use of discretion to determine whether or not loss has
been satisfactorily explained, this is the type of discretion
which in practice is undoubtedly governed by a few simple
rules. It does not call for the weighing of pros and cons of a
policy decision; it does not call for the exercise of judicial
discretion. It would seem to be a ministerial act, the negligent
performance of which should result in liability. If this analysis is correct, the denial of recovery in Denver Buick and
Spaniol Ford is only justified by the combination of the governmental-proprietary distinction with the discretionaryministerial one so as to immunize the public employee unless
an act is neither governmental nor discretionary."
Simply because a government employee performs discretionary or even governmental acts he is not assured of complete immunity. There is no immunity for acts, even judicial
acts, which are clearly beyond the authority or jurisdiction
of the employee. 9 There is also probably no immunity for
94. 478 P.2d at 599.
95. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 25.08 (Supp. 1970).
96. The discretionary function basis for immunity apparently had its origin in
judicial immunity. Courts felt that a judge should be free from concern
over vexatious litigation attempting to make him personally liable for his
decisions reached in good faith. See 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 26.01
(1958). In Wyoming the principle of judicial immunity was recognized in
97.

the case of Linde v. Bentley, 482 P.2d 121 (Wyo. 1971).
WYO. STAT. § 31-40 (1957).

98. Although this has the virtue of limiting employee liability to proprietary
activities where the governmental entity would probably also be liable, it
expands immunity for employees. If consistency is important, perhaps
governmental entities ought to be denied immunity except for injuries
caused by discretionary acts.
99. See Linde v. Bentley, 482 P.2d 121 (Wyo. 1971). "[I]t has long been the
rule that courts of general jurisdiction are exempt from liability of civil
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acts done in bad faith, intentional torts or false imprisonment.' 0 Although no Wyoming cases have discussed liability
in these last three areas, in one case a sheriff's surety was held
liable for a 22 hour, illegal search of the plaintiff's premises.'
Presumably the surety was only liable if the sheriff
was liable and it would appear that the sheriff was guilty of
false imprisonment. In another case the court said that a
deputy-sheriff who effects an irregular and illegal abduction
does so in his role as a private individual.'
Presumably,
acting as a private individual he would be liable.'
Finally

it should be noted that under the Federal civil rights statutes
any state or local officer or employee, other than a judge or
a legislator, who is responsible for depriving a person of a
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States may be liable to that person in an
action for damages."0 Litigation arising out of the notorious
incident at the University of Wyoming involving the dismissal of fourteen Blacks from the football squad was based,
in part, upon this Federal cause of action."'

100.

101.
102.
103.
104.

105.

action for their official acts even if in excess of their jurisdictionalthough a distinction is observed between excess of jurisdiction and the
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter." Id. at 123. Cf.
Hamblin v. Arzy, 472 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1970) (It was alleged that the
defendant game wardens were individually liable when they exceeded their
authority. The court remanded on other grounds.). For a general discussion of liability for acts in excess of jurisdiction see 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 26.05 (1958, Supp. 1970).
DAVIS, supra note 99, at §§ 26.03, 26.04. See also Handler & Klein, The
Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive
Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1960); VAN ALSTYNE, A STUDY RELATING
TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 406-11 (Calif. Law Revision Comm'n 1963) (false
imprisonment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35, 41 (1965) (false
imprisonment).
Lynch v. Burgess, 40 Wyo. 30, 273 P. 691 (1929).
Kingen v. Kelley, 3 Wyo. 566, 28 P. 36 (1891).
Cf. Ellis v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 74 Wyo. 226, 286 P.2d 597
(1955), where the court declined to decide whether suits against officials
in their private capacity could be sustained.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986 (1970). The
Eleventh Amendment prevents the application of these statutes to states,
and by court decision they apparently are not applicable to local government. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
The exemption for
legislators and judges was established in the cases of Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) respectively.
For a general discussion of the Act and citations to leading articles see
Comment, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights
Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 1015 (1967). For a discussion of the act as it
relates to employee liability in particular see DAVIS, supra note 99, § 26.06.
Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971). The circuit court of
appeals stated that although damages may be recovered under the act
from defendants as individuals, "[w]hen the action in essence is for
recovery of money from the State the immunity is available even though
individual officials are nominal defendants." Id. at 429. Since the pleadings in the case indicated that the employees and officers were being sued
in their official capacity, the dismissal of the damage counts was affirmed.
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Notwithstanding these exceptions, the immunity accorded
to public employees in Wyoming is broad. No Wyoming cases
have yet imposed liability for damages upon the agent or officer of any governmental unit. Although the Denver Buick
and Spaniol Ford cases allow for liability for the negligent
performance of ministerial functions, the nature of the activities in those cases seems to be ministerial yet no liability is
allowed. Aside from the exceptions noted in the previous
paragraph, governmental employees in Wyoming are apparently entitled to the immunity of the governmental entity for
which they work.'
Since public employees do not usually have large pecuniary resources, the limitation upon their liability in Wyoming
does not have a significant effect upon the ability of injured
parties to recover. Also this immunity of public employees is
only fair to the employees themselves. This is because in the
private sector employee liability for damages is invariably
satisfied by the employer; therefore the traditional agency
rules imposing servant liability are virtually meaningless.
To make the public employee liable when his private counterpart is not, simply because governmental entities have immunity and cannot voluntarily assume liability as private
corporations do,1"' would be an unfair burden on the public
employee."' 8 The solution to the injustices of governmental
immunity should be making the governmental entity, not
employees, liable for wrongs committed within the scope of
employment. The retention of personal liability for intentional wrongs ought, of course, to be preserved.
B. Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
The distinction between governmental and proprietary
activities was introduced into American jurisprudence in 1842
In view of the immunity of the state it is difficult to see how the state
could legally assume a judgment against the individual defendants regardless of the capacity in which they were sued. To use the pleadings to
resolve this problem is inadequate.
106. Although there are no reported Wyoming cases involving city or school
district employees as defendants it is not likely that a court would impose
liability on a different basis from state or county employees.
107. See Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808
(1959).
108. 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 26.02 (1958). It is of interest that under
the Federal Tort Claims Act a federal employee is not liable to an injured
party for negligence in driving a motor vehicle if the government is liable.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1970).
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in the case of Bailey v. City of New York' and subsequently
was adopted as a test of municipal liability in almost every
state.11 The first Wyoming case to discuss the governmentalproprietary distinction was Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Association."' The court assumed that the defendant Association
which furnished water to the public for irrigation was a public
corporation but held it had the same liability a municipality
would have in furnishing water. Municipalities, it observed,
have
two classes of powers, the one legislative and governmental, the other proprietary or business; and
that, as to the latter, while having the same powers,
they are also subject to the same liabilities as private
corporations or individuals."'
Since in other states municipalities were held to be acting in
a proprietary capacity in furnishing water, the court concluded that the Association was responsible for the wrongful
acts of its agent.
Several subsequent Wyoming cases have followed the
governmental-proprietary distinction. Besides a water system, the operation of garbage removal and disposal services...
and a sewage system" 4 have been classified proprietary activities for which municipalities may be liable. Whether the
maintenance of streets within a municipality is a proprietary
function or an obligation the violation of which gives rise to
liability on some other basis has been subject to conflicting

views in the Wyoming cases."' In two cases involving assess109. 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842).
110. 18 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.23 (3d rev. ed. 1963). The
leading critical commentary on the governmental-proprietary distinction is
Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
ProprietaryTest, 22 VIR. L. REv. 910 (1936).
111. 29 Wyo. 391, 213 P. 938 (1923). Since the action in this case was for an
injunction only, the question of damages was not at issue. The court,
however, discussed the injunction question in terms which would be equally
applicable to damages.
112. Id. at 397, 213 P. at 940.
113. Town of Douglas v. York, 445 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1968). Contra Villalpando
v. City of Cheyenne, 51 Wyo. 300, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937) (dicta).
114. South Cheyenne Water & Sewer Dist. v. Stundon, 483 P.2d 240 (Wyo.
1971); Lore v. Town of Douglas, 355 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1960).
115. Compare Town of Douglas v. York, 445 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1968); Savage v.
Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152 (1957) (dictum) (proprietary),
with Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1965) ; Wilson v. City
of Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119 (1948) ; Opitz v. Town of City of
Newcastle, 35 Wyo. 358, 249 P. 799 (1926); Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne,
34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710 (1925) (dictum) (governmental). See Chavez v.
City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964). Liability for maintenance of
public ways is discussed at pp. 256-60 infra.
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ment of municipal property for taxation, a municipal electric
system and certain leased buildings at a city airport have been
held to be proprietary, not governmental, enterprises.1 1 On
the other hand Wyoming cases have said that street sprinkling; .. operation of a fire department;"s pursuit of criminals ;119 construction of roads, 2 ' ditches,"st sewers, 2 2 and sidewalks ;12 the issuance, refusal, and revocation of permits and
licenses ;.4 the purchase of liquor by the Wyoming Liquor
Commission.. and the operation of hospitals'2 6 are governmental functions for immunity purposes.
In one case, Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne,"7 the court
tried to escape the governmental-proprietary distinction by
adopting a third category: activities traditionally done by
charitable institutions, for which liability could only be imposed for certain "nondelegable duties, such as the duty of
using due care in selecting ... employees and in keeping...
premises safe for invitees.""' *The operation of playgrounds
was classified as such a charitable function and a wrongful
death action was allowed when a boy was fatally injured on
a defective swing. Whether this charitable function classification with limited liability is still viable even for municipalities is doubtful. In subsequently classifying a county hospital
as a governmental function, the Wyoming court at least
severely limited the charitable category.2 9
116. Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of Equal., 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700
(1958) (electric); City of Cheyenne v. Board of County Comm'rs, 484 P.2d
706 (Wyo. 1971) (airport). Although in both cases the court said that
the assessment question did not involve immunity from suit, the analysis
and the results were similar to immunity cases in other jurisdictions involving comparable activities. 18 McQuILLIN, supra note 110, § 53.101 (municipal power plants), § 53.92 n. 74 (leased buildings).
117. Villalpando v. City of Cheyenne, 51 Wyo. 300, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937).
118. White v. City of Casper, 35 Wyo. 371, 249 P. 563 (1926).
119. Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 338 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1959).
120. Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964); Wilson v. City of
Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119 (1948).
121. McCormick v. Town of Thermopolis, 478 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1970); cf. Jacoby
v. Town of Gillette, 62 Wyo. 487, 174 P.2d 505 (1947).
122. See Town of Douglas v. York, 445 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1968).
123. See Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152 (1957); Quest v.
Town of Upton, 36 Wyo. 1, 252 P. 506 (1927).
124. Wickstrom v. City of Laramie, 37 Wyo. 389, 262 P. 22 (1927).
125. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
126. Bondurant v. Board of Trustees, 354 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1960).
127. 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710 (1925).
128. Id. at 81, 241 P. at 714.
129. Bondurant v. Board of Trustees, 354 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1960).
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Several attempts have been made in the Wyoming cases
to define the rationale for the governmental-proprietary distinction and the principles for determining into which category a particular activity fits. 3 ' In Ramirez the court gave
the following explanation for the distinction:
[A] 11 duties of municipal corporations are performed
either as a substitute for the state and for the benefit of the public in general, or as a substitute for
business corporations and for the benefit of the municipality. In the performance of the first class of
duties the city is immune as the state would be, and
in the other it is liable as a business corporation
would be.''
Several cases have emphasized that if an activity is directed
particularly at the health and welfare of the public at large,
the activity is governmental." 2 It has also been said that if
the activity is undertaken at the direction of the legislature...
or if it involves the exercise of legislative or judicial discretion ,'1 it is governmental. On the other hand, if the activity

has historically been conducted by private corporations..6 or
if it generates revenues from fees,' it is termed proprietary.

These guides to whether an activity is governmental or
proprietary do not resolve all situations. Why should the
buying and selling of liquor for profit be a governmental
function as it was held to be in Harrisonv. Wyoming Liquor
Commission?3 7 On the other hand why should the operation
of a sewer system be proprietary as it was held to be in Love
130.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

137.

For attempts to formulate and explain the principles which determine
whether an activity is governmental or proprietary see 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 29.6, at 1620-23 (1956); Borchard, supra note 3, 34 YALE L.J. at
130-36; Kramer, supra note 10, at 817; Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
214, 219-22 (1942) ; Seasongood, supra note 110.
34 Wyo. at 80, 241 P. at 714.
Bondurant v. Board of Trustees, 354 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1960); Villalpando v.
City of Cheyenne, 51 Wyo. 300, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937).
See Bondurant v. Board of Trustees, 354 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1960).
See Wickstrom v. City of Laramie, 37 Wyo. 389, 262 P. 22 (1927); cf.
Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152 (1957).
Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710 (1925) ; cf. Town of
Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of Equal., 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700 (1958).
Town of Douglas v. York, 445 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1968); Ramirez v. City of
Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710 (1925); cf. Town of Pine Bluffs v.
State Bd. of Equal., 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700 (1958). But cf. Lore v.
Town of Douglas, 355 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1960) (Lack of separate charge
for sewer service does not make activity governmental.).
63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
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v. Town of Douglas?.38 Certainly the latter is more necessary
to the health and welfare than acting as a liquor wholesaler
and as necessary as sprinkling streets, a governmental activity. ' Possibly feeling that fine distinctions promote justice,
courts have even split an activity between its governmental
and proprietary components. Thus in one of the Wyoming
cases involving tax assessments the court termed governmental
only that part of a municipal power system which was necessary to light streets, operate traffic signals and light town
offices. 4 Such narrow lines have been drawn in several states
with regard to water systems. 4 ' Also some activities such as
the maintenance of parks have no tradition as either a business or governmental function for the court to fall back on.
In Ramirez the court tried to create a new category to handle
such cases."'
A different problem with the classification appears in
distinguishing between liability for maintenance and for construction of the same facility. If the facility is part of a
proprietary activity, there is liability for damages caused by
failure to exercise due care in maintaining the facility. 4 '
Construction of the same facility is a governmental function,
apparently on the basis of the discretion involved in deciding
whether to build the facility, the amount to spend and the
The resulting immunity for construction, however,
design.'
unlike the apparent absolute immunity for most governmental
functions, is qualified by the extent to which discretion may
have been abused. Thus if as a matter of law the construction
plan is defective, municipalities may be held liable for what
is classified a governmental function.1 4 5 Apparently the
138. 355 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1960).
139. Villalpando v. City of Cheyenne, 51 Wyo. 300, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937).
140. Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of Equal., 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700
(1958). Distinction noted with approval for immunity purposes in Town
of Douglas v. York, 445 P.2d 760, 762-63 (Wyo. 1968).
141. MCQUILLIN, supra note 110, § 53.103.
142. 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710 (1925).
143. See South Cheyenne Water & Sewer Dist. v. Stundon, 483 P.2d 240 (Wyo.
1971); Town of Douglas v. York, 445 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1968); Chavez v.
City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964) ; cf. Wilson v. City of Laramie,
65 Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119 (1948) (streets).
144. See Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152 (1957); cf.
Quest v. Town of Upton, 36 Wyo. 1, 252 P. 506 (1927).
145. McCormick v. Town of Thermopolis, 478 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1970) ; see Savage
v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152 (1957); f. Quest v. Town
of Upton, 36 Wyo. 1, 252 P. 506 (1927). See discussion of construction
of public ways, p. 259. infra.
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courts have found the results which would flow from a strict
application of the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions unsatisfactory.
Although the governmental-proprietary distinction has
been used in most states only in connection with municipal liability, in Wyoming several cases involving the state and
counties have indicated that those units of government may
be liable for wrongs committed during the performance of
proprietary functions.'4 6 low state liability for proprietary
functions can be reconciled with the interpretation of the
Wyoming Constitution which prohibits suits unless explicitly
authorized by the legislature is a conundrum which only the
courts can resolve.14 7 If liability for proprietary functions
does extend beyond municipalities, it may be, nevertheless,
that the courts would be reluctant to make decisions in municipal cases determinative of whether similar state activity
gives rise to liability. In Harrisonv. Wyoming Liquor Commission,4 ' what would appear certainly to be a proprietary
function, the purchase of brandy for resale, was held to be
governmental. The court felt that the state may have decided
to act as a wholesaler for governmental reasons-to insure
that the liquors sold were types least apt to be injurious to
the health and well-being of the residents of the state or to
adopt pricing policies to discourage consumption or to raise
money for the state. If similar groping analyses were followed
in the municipal area, many traditionally proprietary functions could be classified as governmental.
While the governmental-proprietary distinction has done
much to ameliorate the harshness of the immunity rule and is
easily and logically applied to certain types of activities, it
has been the subject of widespread criticism by the commentators.4 9 and even by some of the courts which follow it.' The
146. Supra note 38. Cf. Denver Buick, Inc. v. Pearson, 465 P.2d 512 (Wyo.
1970). Presumably the same liability would be shared by school districts
and other units of government, although no Wyoming cases have so
indicated.
147. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8. See pp. 236-38 supra.
148. 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
149. E.g., 3 DAviS, ADMINIsTRATvF LAW, § 25.07 (1958); articles cited in note
130 supra.
150. E.g., Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 75-76, 241 P. 710, 712
(1925); Weeks v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. Super. 166, 162 A.2d 314 (App.
Div. 1960), aff'd 34 N.J. 250, 168 A.2d 11 (1961).
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difficulty of classifying the myriad of municipal and state
activities has given rise to inconsistencies between courts and
arbitrary distinctions which offer little guidance and promote the suspicion that rationality does not prevail in this
area.' In Villalpando v. City of Cheyenne,"2 it was observed
that in difficult cases the courts decide whether an activity is
governmental or proprietary not on the basis of the nature of
the particular activity involved but on the court's view as to
the desirability of the policy of governmental immunity itself. The opinion then concluded that
Only the law making bodies of the several jurisdictions can really and positively settle which policy
should be followed. They seem generally not to undertake the task. Until they do, the courts must
strive as best they can to follow what they deem the
sounder reasoning and the consensus of opinion as
announced by courts of high repute throughout the
nation.'18
C. Exceptions to Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
1. Discretionary-Ministerial
Even where an activity is proprietary, there may yet be
immunity and where an activity is governmental, there may
be liability. A wrongful act occurring in connection with a
proprietary function may not result in liability of the act was
discretionary.'5 4 Whether the converse-a ministerial act in
the course of a governmental activity-would result in governmental liability is not clear."5 Although courts in other
states have on occasion used the discretionary-ministerial distinction in connection with governmental as opposed to employee liability,"' no Wyoming cases have explicitly attempted such an application of the distinction." 7 In Wyo151. See Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, supra note 150, at 76, 241 P. at 712,
noting the difficulty courts have had in classifying municipal maintenance
of public parks and playgrounds. See also DAVIs, eupra note 149.
152. 51 Wyo. 300, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937).
153. Id. at 317, 65 P.2d at 1115-16.
154. See note 88 supra..

155. Id.
156. Kramer, supra note 10, at 820-21.
157. However, for indication of implicit application of the distinction to decisions
on construction plans see cases cited in notes 143-45, upra and in notes
175-77, infra. It is noteworthy that these cases only grant immunity for
negligence, not negligence as a matter of law.
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rning, therefore, the discretionary-ministerial distinction is
only a potential limitation on the governmental-proprietary
schema.
2. Public Ways
Although the maintenance of public ways "would seem
to be a governmental or public function, ... most of the courts
of this country... have held cities liable for negligence in failing to keep their streets in a safe condition for travel."' 5 8 Several bases have been suggested for this liability. 5 ' These include calling defects or obstructions in public ways nuisances
which municipalities are responsible for abating and classifying the maintenance function as a ministerial activity for
which not only employees but also municipalities themselves
would be liable.'
Sometimes the basis is statutory. Statutes
may explicitly impose liability.'
Or, as one Wyoming case
apparently held, the entire statutory scheme may impose such
a duty upon municipalities to maintain public ways that even
without a waiver of immunity persons injured by breaches
of the duty are entitled to recover."6 2 None of these explanations is adequate. It appears that municipal immunity for
public ways is an illogical exception to the rule of immunity
for governmental functions."0 ' Equally difficult to explain
is the limitation of liability for public ways to municipalities.
158. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 78, 241 P. 710, 713 (1925). For
Wyoming cases in accord and contra see note 115 supra.
159. See 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 532 (1966).
160. Id. at 534. For Wyoming cases indicating that nuisance may be a basis
for liability see note 189 infra and the accompanying text.
161. See WYO. STAT. § 15.1-195 (1957), repealed by Ch. 61, § 1, Wyo. Laws
1967. Two rather obscure sections of the Wyoming Statutes, §§ 15.1-274,
-276, might impose liability upon city manager municipalities for streets
which are insufficient or unsafe for travel. While neither section explicitly
gives cause of action against such cities, Section 15.1-274 makes liable any
person responsible for such conditions (presumably including city employees), and both sections by providing that the city is to recover from
other defendants any payment it makes upon the judgment indicate that
the city too can be made a defendant. However, these actions appear
merely to assume the common law of municipal responsibility for maintenance of streets.
162. Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1965). This theory could
provide a basis for governmental liability in many areas where by statute
certain functions are required to be performed. For an attempt to distinguish
Fanning see Denver Buick, Inc. v. Pearson, 465 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1970).
The Fanning case will be further discussed in connection with statutory
waiver of immunity in the next installment of this article.
163. 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 532 (1966). Since in Russell v. Men of Devon,
100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788), the case frequently cited as the basis for
municipal immunity, recovery was denied for injuries caused by a bridge
that was out of repair, the background of municipal liability for the
maintenance of public ways is even more mysterious.
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The common law rule, which apparently has been adopted in
Wyoming, accords the state, counties and special districts
immunity from liability for injuries caused by defective public ways.' 64
In Wyoming the case of Opitz v. Town of City of Newcastle.65 appears to be the first time the court was presented
with a claim against a municipality for a defective street. 6' 6
There one Levi Knecht with the Opitz family as passengers
was motoring through the town shortly after dark when to
their surprise the street ended without warning and the car
dropped into ten feet of water. A bridge had washed out a
month before and the town had apparently never erected any
barriers warning of this condition. The court dismissed the
town's defense of immunity and stated the following rule:
[M]unicipalities, which have full and complete control over the streets within their corporate limits
. . . are liable for damages for injuries sustained in
consequence of their failure to use reasonable care in
keeping them in a reasonably safe condition for public travel, and in safeguarding, by proper danger signals, the places of danger thereon.16 7
Although the court recognized that the maintenance of streets
would seem to be a governmental function, it felt that the
liability of municipalities for defective public ways was as
well established as the immunity doctrine itself and placed the
responsibility for overruling municipal liability in this area
on the legislature. As both an indication of the extent to
which liability was accepted and of the legislature's being
the appropriate branch of government to establish ininunity,
the court cited a statute which had qualified the liability of
cities for damages sustained by reason of defective public
164. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 29.7, at 1628-29 (1956) ; Borchard, supra note 8,
34 YALE L.J. at 229-31.

In

Wyoming compare Opitz v. Town of City of

Newcastle, 35 Wyo. 358, 249 P. 799 (1926) with Price v. State Highway
Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946).
165. 35 Wyo. 358, 249 P. 799 (1926). The mixed nomenclature for the municipality in the case title probably results from a combination of the statutory
definitions of city and town and puffing on the part of the town fathers.
166. Although two earlier cases raised liability questions, one was for what
apparently was a nuisance created by someone other than the city. Kent v.
City of Cheyenne, 2 Wyo. 6 (1877). The other case presented the issue of
municipal liability for a defective sidewalk, but the court dismissed the
appeal upon another ground and declined to rule on the liability issue.
Jenkins v. City of Cheyenne, 12 Wyo. 79, 73 P. 758 (1903).
167. 35 Wyo. at 362, 249 P. at 800.
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ways. 6 ' Presumably the legislature would not have enacted
such a statute if the public way exception to municipal immunity had not been recognized as the prevailing law.
Other cases indicate that this municipal responsibility
for maintenance of public ways includes not only streets but
also sidewalks,' 6 9 curb and gutter,17 and perhaps even traffic
signs.'
This liability for the condition of public ways is,
however, not without qualification. Since liability has traditionally been only for improper maintenance, any injury
arising from causes other than failure of municipalities to
exercise due care in maintaining public ways in a safe condition will not give rise to liability. In Miller v. City of
Lander,"2 a go-kart which was being operated on the city's
streets during its celebration of "Lander Pioneer Days"
struck the plaintiff, an observer of the event. In affirming a
judgment for the city, the court stated that a municipality is
not absolutely liable for all injuries received on its streetsonly ones resulting from dangerous conditions which it authorized or permitted to occur. If the city had authorized or
permitted such an event, it would have violated its duty to
maintain the streets in a safe condition.
Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether an activity
which gave rise to injury is maintenance or something else.
In Villalpandov. City of Cheyenne,"' the city's street sprinkling truck negligently collided with the plaintiff's car. The
court concluded that sprinkling streets was a governmental
function since it promoted the health and welfare of all residents by keeping down dust, thus alleviating what would
168. WYO. STAT. § 15.1-195 (1957) (requiring five days prior written notice of
defect as a condition of liability), repealed by Ch. 61, § 1, Wyo. Laws 1967.
This repeal occurred in the legislative session next following the case of
Bieber v. City of Newcastle, 242 F. Supp. 457 (D. Wyo. 1965), where
Section 15.1-195 was held to preclude a visitor to the city from recovering
for injuries sustained when she fell into a 9 foot hole in a sidewalk since
the officials, who were all aware of the defect, had not received the
statutorily required 5 days prior written notice.
169. Town of Cody v. Soth, 36 Wyo. 66, 252 P. 1021 (1927) ; Bieber v. City of
Newcastle, 242 F. Supp. 457 (D. Wyo. 1965); see Quest v. Town of Upton,
36 Wyo.1,252 P. 506 (1927).
170. See Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152 (1957).
171. See Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1965).
172. 453 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1969). Since the city was covered by liability insurance,
the immunity issue was not raised. The liability of the city was not, however, affected by the presence of insurance. Municipal liability insurance
will be discussed in the next installment of this article.
173. 51 Wyo. 300, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937).
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otherwise be a condition aggravating to peoples' respiratory
systems. However, sprinkling is also maintenance in that it
keeps the roadbed intact. The court offered no standard to
facilitate the distinction between activities which are bona fide
street maintenance, for which there is municipal liability,
and activities which are not. Although it may be suggested
that the municipal responsibility for injuries arising out of
negligent maintenance of public ways does not include injuries resulting from negligent operation of maintenance
vehicles, some courts have rejected such a limitation."
In addition, maintenance does not include construction.
Wyoming cases have limited the municipal liability for defects
in public ways due to construction or engineering without,
however, granting total immunity.'7 5 As in the case of construction plans in the governmental-proprietary discussion
above, the plan of construction apparently must be negligent
as a matter of law before municipal liability will be imposed.17 Perhaps this compromise is a limited recognition of
the discretionary-ministerial distinction, decisions on the construction plan being discretionary, street maintenance ministerial."'
As for accidents during construction, municipal immunity has been granted without apparent qualification. 7 '
In Wilson v. City of Laramie,7 ' a child was killed when a
construction vehicle rolled over him after he disengaged the
gears. Even assuming that the act of leaving the vehicle on
an incline where children could play with it constituted an
attractive nuisance, the court ruled that the immunity applied.
However, if the vehicle had last been used for street maintenance, as opposed to construction, the boy's estate perhaps
could have recovered. i 0 Making the result turn on what
category of work the vehicle was last used in seems arbitrary,
174. See Annot., 52 A.L.R. 524 (1928); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1117, 1126 (1937).
See also McQuillin, supra note 110, § 53.41.
175. Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 809 P.2d 152 (1957) (curb and
gutter); Quest v. Town of Upton, 86 Wyo. 1, 252 P. 506 (1927) (sidewalks).
176. Id. See notes 14345 &upraand accompanying text.
177. The language in the cases cited at note 175 supra, indicates such an
implicit recognition.
178. Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964); Wilson v. City of
Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119 (1948).
179. 65 Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119 (1948).
180. See note 174, supra.
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particularly when maintenance activities shade into construction.
Finally it should be noted that the liability of municipalities for maintenance of public ways has been limited in
Wyoming in connection with accumulation of ice and snow.
In Smith v. Town of Lander, 8 ' a pedestrian was injured on
an icy crosswalk. Due to the severe weather and impracticability of constant maintenance, the court determined that there
was no duty to keep crosswalks free of ice. However, it indicated a greater effort might be expected on sidewalks. Apparently what gives rise to liability at least in part depends
upon balancing the economics of maintenance against the
hazard to the public.
With these qualifications, however, Wyoming has followed other states in creating an illogical exception to the
illogical rule of givernmental immunity. If it is not confusing
enough that there be such qualifications or exceptions to
the exception, one need only recall that aside from municipalities no other governmental entities have traditionally been
held responsible for defects in or maintenance of public ways
182
unless a staute specifically imposed such responsibility.
Why damages caused by a defective roadway within a city's
boundaries are recoverable but not if caused by an identical
defect a few feet away but outside those boundaries is hard
to understand. Even more difficult is the result when the defect is in a state aid road within the municipal boundary.''
Such situations have not yet been presented to the Wyoming
court. These absurdities could be avoided by holding all
governmental units responsible for maintaining public ways.
3. Nuisance
Municipalities are said to be liable for nuisances even if
the activity creating the nuisance is governmental.'
Despite
its similarities to negligence, nuisance is a separate basis of
recovery and is usually limited to property damage, not per181.
182.
183.
184.

67 Wyo. 121, 215 P.2d 861 (1950).
See note 164, supra.
See Lundstrom v. Giacomo, 194 Minn 624, 261 N.W. 465 (1935).
Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 78-79, 241 P. 710, 713 (1925).
See PROSSER, TORTS § 131, at 982-83 (4th ed. 1971).
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sonal injuries.'8 5 Although a nuisance theory appears to have
been the alternate ground for holding a town liable for damages resulting from a sewer back-up,18 no Wyoming case
has clearly relied on nuisance as a basis for liability. In Town
of Douglas v. York,' the court refused to base liability for a
fire started by sparks from the community dump on nuisance,
even though a concurring opinion urged the theory. Whether
municipal liability for public ways could be based on nuisance
is not clear. Although one early Wyoming case apparently
rejected such a theory, 8 the court has since mentioned nuisance with apparent approval.,88 Finally it should be noted
that even assuming that governmental entities may be held
liable for nuisance, the attractive nuisance doctrine has ap190
parently been rejected in Wyoming as a basis for liability.
4. Active Wrongdoing
In at least one state, municipalities have been held liable
for wanton negligence, or "active wrongdoing," in the course
of governmental activities when such negligence or active
wrongdoing is attributable to the municipal corporation."'
Although only one Wyoming case has even referred to active
wrongdoing as an exception to municipal immunity for governmental activities,'9 2 in another case the court implied that
a city could be liable if its negligence is of so gross a nature
as to amount to wanton infliction of injury.193
5. Set-Off
By initiating suit, the government has traditionally been
held to waive its immunity with regard to the subject matter
of the litigation to the extent of its claim.' 9 4 This means that
185. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, supra note 184. Repeated with apparent
approval in Miller v. City of Lander, 453 P.2d 889, 892 (Wyo. 1969). See
Borchard, supra note 3, 34 YALE L.J. at 138-43.
186. Lore v. Town of Douglas, 355 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1960).
187. 445 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1968).
188. Kent v. City of Cheyenne, 2 Wyo. 6 (1877).
189. Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1965); Wilson v. City
of Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234, 244, 199 P.2d 119, 121 (1948).
190. Wilson v. City of Laramie, supra note 189; cf. Maher v. City of Casper,
67 Wyo. 268, 219 P.2d 125 (1950).
191. See Repko, supra note 130, at 223-24, discussing New Jersey cases.
192. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 79-80, 241 P. 710, 713-14 (1925).
193. Maher v. City of Casper, 67 Wyo. 268, 219 P.2d 125 (1950).
194. Note, Governmental Immunity from Counterclaims, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 505

(1950); Note, Sovereign Immunity of the States, 40 MINN. L. REv. 234,

259 (1956).
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to a limited extent liability may be imposed even for damages
arising out of governmental functions. The right of set-off was
recognized in Wyoming by the territorial court.19 Although
the right of set-off has not been discussed in any reported
Wyoming decisions since, it is presumably still the law. The
only limitation is statutory-there can be no right of set-off
against the state unless the claim has first been presented to
the State Auditor and allowed or disallowed by him.' Apparently even if the Auditor disallows a claim, it can still be presented to the court as a set-off against a state claim.
In sum, the common law doctrine of governmental immunity extends to the state of Wyoming and all of its political
subdivisions and probably to public officers, agents and employees. This common law immunity is, however, qualified by
the judicial doctrine of governmental responsibility for proprietary as opposed to governmental functions, the right of
set-off and possibly for ministerial acts. In the case of municipalities it is also qualified by responsibility for the maintenance of public ways and possibly for nuisance and active
wrongdoing. It can also be qualified by consent to liability.
Although consent may take the form of voluntary payment of
claims without litigation or possibly even neglecting to raise
the immunity issue in litigation,197 legislative consent is usually thought to be necessary.'
The next installment of this
article will deal with express and implied legislative consent
to liability, including the purchase of liability insurance, and
the practice and procedure of pressing claims against governmental bodies; it will conclude with a critique of the status of
governmental immunity in Wyoming.

195. Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 2 Wyo. 170, 191 (1879).
196. Wyo. STAT. § 9-72 (1957). The formality of presentment is not, however,
necessary in certain extenuating circumstances.
197. See, e.g., Caillier v. City of Newcastle, 423 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1967); Town
Council v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 263 P. 703 (1928).
198. See Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808

(1959).
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